

Security








- 1 -

OPC UA - Security






- 2 -



Security Yesterday and Today








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Cyber Security – Multiple Aspects 2014



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



	Traditional IT	Higher-Level ICS	Lower-Level ICS
	Confidentiality	Integrity	Availability
Priority	Integrity	Availability	Integrity
•	Availability	Confidentiality	Confidentiality
		Saf	ety





OPC UA Goal: Secure Data Connectivity









Challenge: How To Keep It Secure

Must uphold:



How?

- Build standard with security in mind
- Use industry accepted standards & best practices (Ex. WS-*,NERC, ISA99, NIST...)
- Keep it flexible: Account for evolution






Key Security Factors



- 1. Should the Client and Server trust each other?
- 2. Should the Server trust the current user of a trusted application (Client)?
- 3. How can the data be protected?
- 4. Is there a trace of what happened?








Secure Communications

Backgrounder












Digital Security

Physical Keys & Locks	Cryptographic Keys & Algorithms		
Keys - Physical Locks - Physical	Keys - Large Prime numbers (hard to guess) Locks - Cryptographic Algorithms		
Lock & Unlock	Encrypt & Decrypt		
Block Access, protect contents	Block Access, protect contents, prove identity		






Focus: Mechanics




Sides A & B: Exchange Public Keys






Focus: Mechanics




Side A: Encrypt "Test Phrase" with Public Key B






Focus: Mechanics




Side A: Sign "Test Phrase" with Private Key A, send to B






Focus: Mechanics




Side B: Verify signature of "Test Phrase" with Public Key A






Focus: Mechanics




Side B: Decrypt "Test Phrase" with Private Key B, Message content confirm and confirmed that received from A






Focus: Mechanics




Side B:Encrypt with Public Key A, Sign with Private Key B, Send to A






Focus: Mechanics




Side B: Decrypt with Private Key A, then Encrypt with Public Key A, send to A






Focus: Mechanics



Side A: Decrypt with Private Key A – ensure both sides can process message

Asymmetric Encryption: Each side uses different key to encrypt messages.

Symmetric Encryption: Both sides use agreed to key for encrypt/decrypt





Focus: Signing vs. Encryption

Private and public keys can be used for both functions:

- **Signing:** Proving you are who you say you are
- Encrypting: Protecting the data being sent so only receiver can read


Operation	What's	Generated	Consumed
	Generated	Using	Using
Signing	CRC / Hash	Sender's Private Key	Sender's Public Key
Encrypting	Scrambled	Receiver's	Receiver's
	Message	Public Key	Private Key








Focus: What is a Certificate




- 1. standardized key encoding format
- 2. additional context (expiry date)








Focus: Trusting Certificates









• Example: Certificate

🖳 View Certifica	ate 🗖 🗖 🔁 🔀
Store Type	Directory 🔹
Store Path	%CommonApplicationData%\OPC Foundation\CertificateStores\MachineDefault Browse
Application Name	UA Sample Server
Organization	
Application URI	um:USDC-PC:UA Sample Server
Domains	USDC-PC
Subject Name	CN=UA Sample Server/DC=USDC-PC
Issuer Name	CN=UA Sample Server/DC=USDC-PC
Valid From	2014-01-22 02:16:28
Valid To	2038-09-13 03:16:28
Thumbprint	4A305609DFBC8A820025B14719560367E5C687B2
ОК	Details Export Cancel



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Focus: Certificate Management

- Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
 - System for managing certificates
 - Management options:

Pro:

Low infrastructure cost

Self-Signed

(Manual Process)

Con:

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- work intensive
- does not scale well

Local Certificate Authority (CA)

Pro:

- Medium/Large installations
- Local trust
- Chaining

Con:

Medium cost

External Certificate Authority (CA)

Pro:

- Large installations
- Multiple CA's

Con:

- Medium/high cost
- 3rd Party trust










Focus: Scalable Certificate Management

Certificate Authority "chains"

- Create hierarchy
- Improve organization
- CAs issue/revoke certificates
- Applications selectively trust CAs




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Focus: Trusting Certificates





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Focus: Example Certificate Management Utility (OPC Foundation)

	File	Help		
	Manac	e Application	Managa	Certificates M
Import Application Certificate Import Create Application Certificate Create Assign Application Certificate Assis View Trust List Disp Assign Trust List Assis Add Certificate to Trust List Copi Import Certificate to Trust List Import	ge COM	pplication To M View Applic Import Applic Create Applic	lanage ation Cert cation Cer	Opc.Ua.Sam
Manage Application Permissions Man	nages ac	Assign Application Certificate		
	- [View	Trust List	
		Assign	n Trust Lis	t
		Add Certific	ate to Tru	ist List
		Import Certifi	cate to Tr	ust List
		Сору	Trust List	
		Manage Applic	cation Pe	

Available for OPC Foundation members






File Help

Manage Application | Manage Certific-



OPC UA Security High Level Overview







Security built into specification from ground up.

OPC Unified Architecture Specifications					
Core Specification Parts	Access Type Specification Parts				
Part 1 - Concepts	Part 8 - Data Access				
Part 2 - Security Model	Part 9 - Alarms and Conditions				
Part 3 - Address Space Model	Part 10 - Programs				
Part 4 - Services	Part 11 - Historical Access				
Part 5 - Information Model	Utility Type Specification Parts				
Part 6 - Service Mappings Part 7 - Profiles	Part 12 - Discovery				
	Part 13 - Aggregates				



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OPC UA Security: Auditing



Log all actions

- Audit review as required
- Act on suspicious activity
- Integrate with IDS/IPS

Aud	Audit Log					
ID	Event time	Event type	User name	IP address	Parameters	
1119	2011-04-01 23:26:08.000	Custom field associated to screens	admint	0:0:0:0:0:0:1:1	Field name = Similar issues Associated screens = [Default Screen, Resolve Issue Screen, Wolflow Screen]	
1118	2011-04-01 23:24:46.000	Permission added	admin	0.0:0:0.0.0.0:1	Permission scheme ID = 10000 Permission type - Ability to move issues between project to between vordflows of the same project (if applicable). Note the user can only move issues to a project he or sho has the greate permission for. Permission scheme name = Updated Permission Schem	
1117	2011-04-01 23:24:27.000	Permission added	admin	0:0:0:0.0.0:0:1	Permission scheme ID = 10000 Permission type = Ability to administer a project in JIRA Permission scheme name = Updated Permission Schem	
1118	2011-04-01 23:23:34.000	Permission scheme added	admin1	0:0:0:0:0:0:1:1	Permission scheme description = A new updated permission scheme Permission scheme name = Updated Permission Schem	
1115	2011-04-01 23:18:29.000	User project roles edited	admin1	0:0:0:0:0:0:1:1	Assigned project roles = [For project Migration (MGR) rol Users, For project Migration (MGR) role Developers] User name = adambaker	
1114	2011-04-01 23:18:05:000	User groups edited	admin	0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1	Groups joined = [jira-administrators, jira-developers] User name = adama	
1113	2011-04-01 23:17:20.000	Project edited	admin	0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1	Project ID = 10100 Project name = Migration Project URL, = http://www.migration-project.org Project URL = http://www.migration.project.#1 Project lead = admin	
1112	2011-04-01 23:18:05.000	Project added	admin	0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1	Project name = Migration Project URL = http://www.migration-project.org Project dexp = MGR Project dexpipion = Migration project Project lead = admin	
1111	2011-03-17 12:45:21.000	User groups edited	admin	0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1	Groups joined = jira-developers User name = adamherbert	
1110	2011-03-17	User groups edited	admin	0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1	Groups left = [jira-administrators, jira-developers] User name = adampreble	


Events found: 19


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OPC UA Security: Highlights









OPC UA Security: Objectives

Application Authentication

- All application must have a unique Application instance Certificate
- URI should identify the instance, vendor and product

User Authentication

- Username / password, WS-Security Token or X.509
- Fits into existing infrastructures like Active Directory

User Authorization

Granular control over user actions: read, write, browse, execute

Server Availability

- Minimum processing before authentication

 Restricting message size
 No security related error codes returned

System Auditability – Generating audit events for security related operations





OPC UA Security: Objectives

Availability → Fast & Efficient Authentication

- Integrity → Signing of Messages
- OPC UA Information and Functionality


Confidentiality -> Encrypting of Messages
 OPC UA
 Information and
 Functionality

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



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OPC UA Security: Services
















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
OPC UA Security: Standards Based


- OPC UA relies upon <u>approved security standards</u>
 - WS-Security
 - WS-Trust
 - WS-Secure Conversation
 - Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS)
 - Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
 - Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)














OPC UA Security: Flexibility

- Flexibility and Extensibility
 - Profiles and Policies
 - Profiles list various functionalities of UA applications






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OPC UA Security: Flexibility

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 - Profiles and Policies
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
Transport Layer









OPC UA Security: Configuration 20









Global Directory Service (GDS)











- OPC UA Part 4 Services OPC UA Part 6 Mappings OPC UA Part 7 Profiles OPC UA Part 12 Discovery
- OPC UA security should be part of a security management system
- OPC UA is secure-by-design addressing security concerns by providing:
 - Authentication of Users, Application instances (Software)
 - Confidentiality and integrity by signing and encrypting messages
 - Availability by minimum processing before authentication
 - Auditability by defined audit events for OPC UA operations
- OPC UA allows different levels of security
- OPC UA certificate management can be retrofitted or new!



OPC UA Security: Standards Based

- ICS Security Is Nothing New!
- Developed with industry security experts from multiple companies
- NIST and other experts reviewed the OPC standard
- Working with security Certification Groups to ensure it is current






Questions






Paul Hunkar

- Technical Director
- Paul.Hunkar@DSInteroperability.com











OPC UA Security: Technologies



	Main goal(s)	Algorithm(s)/ Standard(s)	Usage
MACs	Authentication, Integrity	► HMAC-SHA1► HMAC-SHA256	Message authentication
Signature	Authentication, Integrity	► RSA-SHA1	 Signing certificates, security handshaking
Symmetric Encryption	Confidentiality	 ▶ AES-128-CBC ▶ AES-192-CBC ▶ AES-256-CBC 	Message encryption
Asymmetric Encryption	Confidentiality	► RSA-PKCS1► RSA-OAEP	Security handshaking
Key Generation	Confidentiality	▶ P-SHA1	 Session key generation (for message encryption)
Certificates	Authentication, Authorization	 ► X.509 ► X.509v3 (Extensions) 	 Application authentication, user authentication, key exchange





Subject Names



- Subject names identify the holder of the certificate
 - Structured value with multiple fields
 - Common Name (CN)
 - Organization (O)
 - Country (C)
 - Domain (DC)
- String syntax for display purposes
 - CN=UASampleServer,O=MyCompany,DC=MyComputer
- Subject names are not guaranteed to be unique
 - Thumbprints better choice when a unique id is required
 - Thumbprint is the SHA1 digest of the DER encoded certificate



Subject Alternate Names

- OPC UA Part 1
 OPC UA Part 1
 OPC UA Part 1
 OPC UA Part 1


 OPC UA Part 1
 OPC UA Part 1
 OPC UA Part 1
 OPC UA Part 1

 OPC UA Part 1
 OPC UA Part 1
 OPC UA Part 1
 OPC UA Part 1
- Specify additional names for the certificate
 - Used for validation purposes
 - Domain Name, IP Address, Application URI
- The alternate name binds the certificate to a context
 - Domain/IP address must match the host in the Endpoint URL
 - The URI must match the URI in the Application Description
- Helps prevent spoofing



Administrator Perspective: Certificates

- Certificates stored in a "trust list":
 - File structure
 - Windows Certificate
 Store
- Application's certificates must be trusted, to connect
- Move certificates from "rejected" to "trusted"





Administrator Perspective: Certificates


- Certificate stores scale poorly in large environments.
- Administrative burden of trusts and no-trusts etc.
- Certificate Authorities (CA) can issue certificates.
- Trust the CA, and implicitly trust all apps who certificate was issued

File Help				
Manage Security	Manage Application Ma	nage Certificates	Manage COM Interop HTTP Access Rules	
Store Type	Directory 🗸			
Store Path	%CommonApplicationDat	a 🔜	Create Certificate Authority -	
CA Key File		Store Type	Directory V	
View Certificates		Store Path	%CommonApplicationData%\OPC Foundation\CertificateStores\UA Certificate / 🗸	Browse
Create Certificate Authority		CA Key File		Browse
Select and Issue Certificate		CA Password	******	
		Authority Name	Industrial Department	
Import and Issue Certificate		Organization	Mr Organization	
Export Private Key		Subject Name	CN=Industrial Department/O=Mr Organization	
Import Certificate to Store		Key Size	1024 🗸	
Import Cert	tificates into Store	Lifetime	60 🔶 Months	
Issue SSL/TLS Certificate		Password		
Bind SSL	L/TLS Certificate	Verify Password	**********	
		ОК		Cancel



Administrator Perspective: Certificates

- CA issues App Certificate
- Easier to maintain
- Organization create have >1 CA
- CA's can also "revoke" certificates that have been compromised.









Provisioning / Setup - Server









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Provisioning / Setup - Client







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